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Is the Political Question Doctrine
Jurisdictional or Prudential?
Ron Park*
In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the family members of protestors
killed or injured by bulldozers driven by the Israeli Defense Forces sued the
manufacturer of the bulldozers in federal district court. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit after holding the issues nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held
that the political question doctrine was jurisdictional. As of this moment,
only the Ninth Circuit has explicitly answered the question of whether the
political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. The Supreme
Court has not answered that question and no other Circuit Court of
Appeals has done so either.
This Note attempts to answer that question by making the factors
articulated in the Supreme Court’s key opinion on the political question
doctrine, Baker v. Carr, the central focus of its analysis. In doing so, this
Note concludes that the political question doctrine is either jurisdictional or
prudential depending on which factor is invoked. The first Baker factor is
jurisdictional because it is the only factor that explicitly grounds itself in the
Constitution. The remaining five Baker factors are prudential because they
ask courts to consider things that are aligned with the Court’s prudential
doctrines, such as ripeness.

* The author would like to thank Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and the members of the UC Irvine Law
Review Board for their invaluable guidance and support throughout the process of writing this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the family members of protestors killed or injured
by bulldozers driven by the Israeli Defense Forces sued the manufacturer of the
bulldozers in federal district court.1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
lawsuit after holding the issues to be political questions under the political question
doctrine.2 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit also held that the political question doctrine
was a jurisdictional doctrine.3
This holding had important consequences. If a doctrine is jurisdictional, courts

1. 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 983 (“[W]e hold that plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the first Baker test.”).
3. Id. at 982 (“We hold that if a case presents a political question, we lack subject matter
jurisdiction to decide that question.”).
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are obligated to address the issue before reaching the merits.4 Even if neither party
raises the issue, courts can raise it sua sponte and look beyond the facts in the
pleadings to determine the issue.5 Moreover, the issue cannot be forfeited or waived,
so that at any moment in the litigation the issue can be raised and the case decided
on that ground.6
The consequences of declaring the political question doctrine jurisdictional are
particularly high. Other justiciability doctrines address the parties to the case or the
factual context of the proceedings. Standing ensures that the proper plaintiff is
before the court.7 Mootness ensures that the court is resolving an actual case or
controversy.8 Ripeness ensures that the court is adjudicating a case at the proper
point in time.9 Each of these doctrines leaves open the possibility of later
adjudication of the case once the proper plaintiff is found or the facts of the case
are properly developed. The political question doctrine addresses the issue of the
case itself.10 Once a question is deemed political, the court will never hear the case.11
Moreover, in the case of Corrie, had the Ninth Circuit declared the political question
doctrine to be prudential rather than jurisdictional, it would not have been able to
look beyond the face of the complaint and the court may not have been able to
conclude the way it did.
As of this writing, only the Ninth Circuit has explicitly answered the question
of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. In 1962, the

4. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“[T]he first and fundamental
question is that of jurisdiction . . . . This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even
when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.” (quoting Great
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900))).
5. Corrie, 503 F.3d at 979 (“Only if the doctrine is jurisdictional may we look beyond the facts
alleged in the complaint to decide whether this case presents a political question.”).
6. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93 (stating that jurisdictional arguments “would have to be considered
by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation—indeed, this Court would have to raise
them sua sponte”).
7. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“In essence the question of standing is whether
the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”). See also
Caprice L. Roberts, Asymmetric World Jurisprudence, 32 SEATTLE U.L.REV. 569, 585 (2009) (describing
standing doctrine as communicating “not you”).
8. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). See also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585
(“[M]ootness represents the notion of ‘too late.’”).
9. See Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corporations, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974) (describing
ripeness as “a question of timing”). See also Roberts, supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents
the notion of ‘not yet.’”).
10. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–425 (holding that
whether a statute allowing Americans to list “Israel” as their place of birth on their passports must be
given effect does not present a political question); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993)
(concluding that whether the Senate properly impeached a federal judge is a political question); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that a challenge to legislative apportionment presents “no
nonjusticiable ‘political question’”).
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature
political . . . can never be made in this court.”). See also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 (“The political
question doctrine, however, if deemed applicable by the Court, means the Court will never hear the
case.”).
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Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr, a case where it articulated the six factors a
court must consider when applying the political question doctrine.12 But the
Supreme Court did not answer in Baker or in any other case whether the political
question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential, and no other Circuit Court of
Appeals has explicitly done so either.13 In fact, the question recently came up in the
Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Kansas Building Industry Workers Compensation
Fund v. State.14 The Kansas Supreme Court did not explicitly answer the question,
but the court’s analysis treated the doctrine as jurisdictional.15
A number of scholars have attempted to fill the void: some have argued that
the doctrine is jurisdictional,16 some have argued it is prudential,17 and some have
even suggested the doctrine is a fiction.18 While a few of these articles have
examined the Baker factors,19 none has made the factors the central focus of its
analysis. This Note puts the Baker factors front and center in analyzing the question
of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. Considering
that all political questions are determined by applying the Baker factors, the question
of whether the doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential should be determined based
on an analysis of the factors themselves.
This Note concludes that the political question doctrine is either jurisdictional
or prudential depending on which factor is invoked. The first Baker factor is
jurisdictional. The remaining five Baker factors are prudential. Part I of this Note
provides an overview of the history of the political question doctrine and its current
status in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Part II explains the implications of
pronouncing the doctrine jurisdictional or prudential. Part III discusses the source

12. 369 U.S. at 217.
13. A few Circuits have suggested that the doctrine is jurisdictional. See Taylor v. Kellogg Brown
& Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407 n.9 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that the judiciary is “deprived of
jurisdiction” when the political question doctrine is implicated); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557
(5th Cir. 2008) (stating that political questions are “nonjusticiable” because there is a difference between
finding “no federal jurisdiction” versus declaring that a particular matter is “inappropriate for judicial
resolution”); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (treating the political question
doctrine as jurisdictional); 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of
Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (declaring the political question doctrine as “essentially a
constitutional limitation on the courts”). However, some of these same Circuits have expressed doubts
on the matter. Hegab v. Long, 716 F.3d 790, 800 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the Supreme Court
has not ruled on the matter one way or the other). Cf. Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 527 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (stressing the need to distinguish among a failure to state a claim, a claim that is not justiciable,
and a claim over which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and pointing to the political question
doctrine as an example of where the court has not been consistent about maintaining those distinctions).
14. 359 P.3d 33, 41 (Kan. 2015).
15. Id. at 42.
16. See, e.g., Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
7–9 (1959).
17. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183–92 (1962).
18. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7, at 569; Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested
Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457 (2005).
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of the political question doctrine and why it springs from separation of powers
principles and not Article III of the Constitution. Part IV discusses each Baker factor
and explains why the first is jurisdictional and the other five are prudential. Finally,
Part V provides guidance on how courts are to apply the political question doctrine
in light of this Note’s conclusion.
I. WHAT IS THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE?
A. Early History
For much of U.S. history, there was no clearly defined political question
doctrine. Instead, there were various issues that the Supreme Court thought were
properly resolved by the political branches. For example, cases arising under the
Guaranty Clause of the Constitution and cases relating to various aspects of foreign
relations were held to be nonjusticiable political questions.20
1. Republican Form of Government (Guaranty Clause) Cases
Beginning with Luther v. Borden,21 the Court consistently held claims arising
under the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution22 to be nonjusticiable political
questions. In Luther v. Borden, the Court declared that it rested with Congress to
decide whether a State government was a “republican form of government” as
required by the Constitution, going so far as to state that Congress’s decision “could
not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.”23
The facts of Luther involved an action for trespass—an action that the
defendants sought to justify by claiming they were acting under the authority of the
lawful government of Rhode Island to suppress an insurrection.24 The question
presented to the Court was whether the government under which the defendants
claimed authority was in fact the lawful government of Rhode Island at the time of
the alleged trespass.25 Although the Guaranty Clause did not explicitly identify
Congress as the body to decide that question, the Court held that Congress was the
proper authority because it was the branch that decides whether to admit the
senators and representatives of a particular state into itself.26

20. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
21. Id.
22. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
23. 48 U.S. at 42.
24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 35. The Court also identified the question as a “very serious one” that would
potentially nullify all manner of state action that occurred since the time when the state government
allegedly ceased to exist. Id. at 38–39. This concern was reiterated and expanded upon in Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 141–42 (1911). However, in neither case did the Court explicitly
hold that the question was nonjusticiable because of these concerns.
26. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42. Although it did not do so, the Court could have pointed to Article
IV, Section 3 of the Constitution to support its reasoning. Section 3 states that “[n]ew States may be
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Claims brought under the Guaranty Clause since Luther have all been declared
nonjusticiable without much additional comment on the subject.27
2. Foreign Relations Cases
The Court has also often held questions to be political in matters implicating
foreign relations. In Doe v. Braden, the Court refused to consider the validity of
certain provisions of a treaty, concluding that “the courts of justice have no right to
annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the
United States.”28 This was because the Constitution assigned the powers relating to
foreign relations to the President, including the power to make treaties (provided
two-thirds of the Senators concur).29 The Court also added that it would be
“impossible” for the executive department to conduct foreign relations if “every
court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person who
ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the power . . . to make the
engagements into which he entered.”30
In Terlinden v. Ames, a case involving the continuing existence of a treaty, the
Court declared that “the question whether power remains in a foreign State to carry
out its treaty obligations is in its nature political and not judicial, and that the courts
ought not to interfere with the conclusions of the political department in that
regard.”31 The Court cited back to Doe in support32 and elaborated that it could not
declare the treaty terminated when both the governments of the United States and
the German Empire asserted otherwise.33 Since these cases, the existence of treaties
and the validity of their provisions have generally been held to be political
questions.34
Beyond treaties, the Court has also declared questions on sovereignty over a
territory to be political.35 Sovereignty as a political question can be traced back to

admitted by the Congress into this Union.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. This language supports the idea
that Congress is also the guarantor of a republican form of government.
27. See, e.g., State of Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. for Summit County, 281
U.S. 74, 79–80 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917); State of
Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915);
Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256 (1913); Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 143; Taylor v. Beckham, 178
U.S. 548, 578 (1900).
28. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902).
32. Id. at 288–89.
33. Id. at 289–90.
34. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 476 (1913)
(holding that since the Executive Department waived any right to free itself from the obligations
imposed by the treaty, the “plain duty” of the Court was to recognize those obligations), Cf. Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that selecting a unit
of conversion for limiting liability under the Warsaw Convention was a political question).
35. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1918); Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
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Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., where the Court rhetorically asked whether there
could be “any doubt, that when the executive branch of the government, which is
charged with our foreign relations . . . assumes a fact in regard to the sovereignty of
any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department.”36 Although it did
not explicitly refer to the Constitution, the Court’s reasoning channeled the
document and the importance of separation of powers.37 The Court reasoned that
if it held otherwise, cases would arise that would result in “irreconcilable
difference[s] between the executive and judicial departments.”38
However, not all foreign relations cases have been held to be political
questions. For example, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Court held that there was no
political question in a case involving a statute permitting Americans to list “Israel”
as their place of birth on their passports.39 Similarly, in Japan Whaling Ass’n v.
American Cetacean Society, the Court held that there was no political question in a case
challenging the Secretary of Commerce’s decision not to certify Japan for harvesting
whales in excess of International Whaling Commission quotas.40 In light of these
cases, the Court has not been clear on exactly when a foreign relations issue is
political and when it is not.
B. Modern Formulation
In part because of the haphazard manner in which issues had been declared
political in the past, the Court attempted to formally define the scope of the political
question doctrine in Baker v. Carr.41 The Court prefaced its analysis by noting that
“the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it
presents a political question.”42 Instead, courts are to analyze six factors to
determine the existence of a political question43:
1. Whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
2. Whether there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the issue;
3. Whether it is impossible to decide the issue without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
4. Whether it is impossible for a court to undertake independent
resolution of the issue without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government;
36. 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839).
37. Id. (“It is enough to know, that in the exercise of [the President’s] constitutional functions,
he has decided the question. Having done this under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is
obligatory on the people and government of the Union.”).
38. Id.
39. 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424–425 (2012).
40. 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
41. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 217.
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5.

Whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or
6. Whether there is a potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
Unless one of these factors is “inextricable from the case at bar,” there should be
no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question.44
After Baker, courts analyzing whether an issue is political have referred to at
least one of these six factors in reaching their decisions.45
C. The Supreme Court’s Political Questions Post-Baker
Since Baker, the Supreme Court has held that a question is political in only two
cases. In Nixon v. United States, a former federal judge asserted that the Senate had
not properly “tried” his impeachment proceedings.46 Specifically, the judge claimed
that the word “try” in Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution47 precluded
the Senate from delegating to a select committee the task of hearing the testimony
of witnesses.48 The Court disagreed that “try” imposed any restriction on the Senate,
noting that the specific requirements imposed on the impeachment process by the
Constitution49 suggested that the Framers did not intend to impose additional
requirements by implication.50
Rather, the question was political because it was textually committed to the
Senate.51 The Court focused on the word “sole” in Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of
the Constitution, which states that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.”52 It reasoned that the Senate would not have “sole” authority over
impeachments if courts could review its actions to determine whether it properly
“tried” an impeached official.53 In addition, the Court noted the lack of judicially
manageable standards for defining the word “try,”54 the need for finality in any
impeachment decision,55 and the difficulty of fashioning adequate relief.56
44. Id.
45. E.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49 (1969); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607
F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 160.
46. 506 U.S. at 228.
47. “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 3,
cl. 6.
48. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
49. “The Members must be under oath, a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and the Chief
Justice presides when the President is tried.” Id. at 230.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 228–33.
52. Id. at 229.
53. Id. at 231.
54. Id. at 229–30. The difficulty of defining “try” was part of the reason why the issue was one
textually committed to the Senate. Id.
55. Id. at 236.
56. Id.
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In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court declared that political gerrymandering cases were
nonjusticiable political questions because of a lack of judicially manageable
standards, but only four justices joined the plurality opinion stating that such cases
were always political.57 Justice Kennedy, providing the fifth vote, refused to agree
that political gerrymandering cases were always nonjusticiable, stating that the lack
of judicially manageable standards in the present did not foreclose the possibility of
developing or discovering such standards in the future.58
In no Supreme Court case has one of the other four factors, or even a
combination of the other four factors, been found sufficient to make a question
political without the presence of the first two factors.
II. WHY IT MATTERS WHETHER THE DOCTRINE IS
JURISDICTIONAL OR PRUDENTIAL
As mentioned in the Introduction, if the political question doctrine is
jurisdictional, courts are obligated to address the issue before reaching the merits.59
Even if neither party raises the issue, courts can raise it sua sponte and, on motions
to dismiss, look beyond the facts in the pleadings to decide the case.60 This is
because jurisdictional issues are considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, whereas other issues are typically
considered under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.61 Under Rule 12(b)(6),
the analysis for dismissal is generally confined to a review of the complaint and its
attachments.62 But under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider facts beyond the
complaint.63 In addition, jurisdictional issues cannot be forfeited or waived, so at
any moment in the litigation a party can raise the political question doctrine and the
case can be decided on it.64
These consequences are not mere hypotheticals. In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit against Caterpillar, a United States corporation,
after first finding the political question doctrine a jurisdictional bar 65 and then

57. 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004).
58. Id. at 313.
59. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,
177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)) (“[T]he first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction . . . . This
question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and
without respect to the relation of the parties to it.”).
60. Corrie, 503 F.3d at 979 (“Only if the doctrine is jurisdictional may we look beyond the facts
alleged in the complaint to decide whether this case presents a political question.”).
61. See Lane, 529 F.3d at 557.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93 (stating that jurisdictional arguments “would have to be considered
by this Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation—indeed, this Court would have to raise
them sua sponte”).
65. 503 F.3d at 981–82 (“[T]he political question doctrine . . . . . is at a bottom a jurisdictional
limitation imposed on the courts . . . . We hold that if a case presents a political question, we lack subject
matter jurisdiction to decide that question.”).
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finding the issues presented by the plaintiffs to be political.66 The plaintiffs were
individuals whose family members were killed or injured by the Israeli Defense
Forces (“IDF”) as the IDF was demolishing homes in the Palestinian Territories
using bulldozers manufactured by Caterpillar.67 The IDF ordered the bulldozers
directly from Caterpillar, but the United States government paid for them.68 The
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, an injunction directing
Caterpillar to cease providing equipment to the IDF, and other relief under several
claims.69 Because the Ninth Circuit considered the foreign relations issues
inextricable from the plaintiffs’ claims, it held that the case presented a political
question and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case.70 The Ninth Circuit
was only able to reach this decision because a court can look beyond the face of the
complaint when considering a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional issues.71 Had the
Ninth Circuit declared the political question doctrine to be prudential, it would not
have been able to look beyond the face of the complaint and the court may not have
concluded the way it did.
The consequences of declaring the political question doctrine jurisdictional are
particularly high for future litigants and the development of the law as well. The
other justiciability doctrines address the parties to the case or the factual context of
the proceedings. Standing ensures that the proper plaintiff is before the court.72
Mootness ensures that the court is resolving an actual case or controversy.73
Ripeness ensures that the court is adjudicating a case at the proper point in time.74
Each of these doctrines leaves open the possibility of later adjudication of the case
once the proper plaintiff is found or the facts of the case are properly developed.
The political question doctrine addresses the issue of the case itself.75 Once a
question is deemed political, the court will never hear the case.76
66. Id. at 983 (“[W]e hold that plaintiffs’ claims are nonjusticiable under the first Baker test.”).
67. Id. at 977.
68. Id. at 978.
69. Id. at 979.
70. Id. at 983–84.
71. Id. at 982 (“We may therefore look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether
the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action under the political question doctrine.”).
72. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”); see also Roberts, supra
note 7, at 585 (describing standing doctrine as communicating “not you”).
73. See Rice, 404 U.S. at 246; see also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 (“[M]ootness represents the
notion of ‘too late.’”).
74. See Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 140 (describing ripeness as “a question of timing”); see also Roberts,
supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents the notion of ‘not yet.’”).
75. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424–425 (holding that whether a statute allowing Americans
to list “Israel” as their place of birth on their passports must be given effect does not present a political
question); Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226 (concluding that whether the Senate properly impeached a federal
judge is a political question); Baker, 369 U.S. at 209 (holding that a challenge to legislative apportionment
presents no political question).
76. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (“Questions, in their nature political . . . can never be made
in this court.”); see also Roberts, supra note 7, at 585 (“The political question doctrine, however, if deemed
applicable by the Court, means the Court will never hear the case.”).
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III. SOURCE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. The Difference Between the Political Question Doctrine
and Other Justiciability Doctrines
As discussed above, federal courts often consider other justiciability
doctrines—such as standing, mootness, and ripeness—when considering a case.
These doctrines trace their origins to Article III of the Constitution and its case-orcontroversy requirement.77 Although the political question doctrine has sometimes
been associated with Article III,78 the doctrine’s history and development is distinct
from Article III and the justiciability doctrines that spring forth from it.
The early, pre-Baker cases that held one issue or another to be political never
cited Article III or the case-or-controversy requirement as their reason. Rather,
those cases typically referred to the separation of powers and the Constitution’s
allocation of certain powers and responsibilities to either the legislative or executive
branches of government.79 Cases that did not cite to separation of powers or the
Constitution usually cited to other cases that ultimately traced their reasoning back
to those sources.80 In at least one instance, the Court also called issues political by
referring to notions of custom and legal tradition predating the establishment of the
United States.81 However, even that justification implicitly relied on the idea that
the issue was committed to another branch of government—the legislative or the
executive—and not the judicial.82
Another key difference between the political question doctrine and the other
justiciability doctrines, such as standing, mootness, and ripeness, is that the latter
doctrines seek to ensure that a federal court does not issue advisory opinions.83
Deciding an issue when the plaintiff does not have standing or when the

77. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of standing is
an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”);
Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 (quoting Liner v. Jafco Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (explaining that mootness
originates from “the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial
power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy”); see also Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 138 (noting
that ripeness involves, “in part, the existence of a live ‘Case or Controversy’”).
78. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
79. E.g., Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 657; Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42; Williams, 38 U.S. at 420.
80. E.g., Bryant, 281 U.S. at 79–80; Mountain Timber Co., 243 U.S. at 234; Terlinden, 184 U.S. at
288–89.
81. Jones, 137 U.S. at 212–16.
82. Id. at 212 (noting that the determination of sovereignty is a “political question” that is
determined by the “legislative and executive departments” and that this principle has “always been
upheld by this court” and “is equally well settled in England”).
83. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 598 n.4 (“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts
do not render advisory opinions . . . .”); St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42 (1943) (“A federal
court is without power to decide moot questions or to give advisory opinions which cannot affect the
rights of the litigants in the case before it.”); cf. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 631–32 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (explaining that ripeness, like mootness, serves to prevent a federal court from
issuing advisory opinions).
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controversy is moot results in an opinion that has no tangible effect.84 However,
the political question doctrine does not share that same quality. Many of the cases
where the Court declared a question political were cases where an actual decision
on the merits would have had a tangible effect on the litigating parties.85 There was
nothing “advisory” about a potential opinion.
B. The Political Question Doctrine’s Source
Rather, the political question doctrine arises from the structure of our federal
government and the Constitution’s division of powers and responsibilities between
the three branches of government.86 Its purpose is to ensure that courts do not
usurp the powers of the legislative or executive branches.87 More generally, it is a
recognition of the limitations of courts in answering every question that might be
brought before them.88 Where courts held questions to be political, they determined
that the issues were either committed to or better addressed by the executive or
legislative branches.89 Where courts did not hold a question to be political, they
determined that the issues were either committed to or properly addressed by the
judicial branch.90 Without separation of powers—if the government were simply a
single entity exercising all three powers—it would make little sense to ask whether
a question was properly before a court. At its core, the doctrine seeks to answer the
question, “Which branch is the right branch to resolve this issue?”
Each of the six factors either directly or indirectly seeks to answer this
question.
1. How Factor One Preserves Separation of Powers
The first factor explicitly looks for a “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue” to a particular branch.91 This is the most straightforward
of the factors. Courts are asked to look at the text of the Constitution and determine
whether the document places resolution of the issue with either the legislative or
executive branch rather than the judicial branch.92 The first factor therefore directly

84. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (noting that without standing, a
federal court’s “exercise of its power . . . would be gratuitous”); St. Pierre, 319 U.S. at 42 (deciding moot
questions would not affect the rights of the litigants before the court).
85. E.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. 224 (whether Senate properly “tried” an impeachment);
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (whether the defendant trespassed); Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (whether the
plaintiff could eject the defendant from certain lands).
86. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function
of the separation of powers.”).
87. See id. at 210–011.
88. See id.
89. Nixon, 506 U.S. 224; Vieth, 541 U.S. 267.
90. E.g., Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421; Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. 221.
91. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
92. Id.; Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. Of course, the problem is that the text of the Constitution is
silent about judicial review. So, by definition, it is also silent about precluding judicial review in specific
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asks courts to consider the separation of powers and whether the question before
the court is one that courts are properly empowered to answer. Although there may
be different policy reasons behind a constitutional commitment of an issue to a
particular political branch, the first factor does not ask courts to delve into such
considerations nor does it require the commitment be justified in any way. The
Framers may have desired one issue to be committed to a particular branch for one
reason and preferred that another issue be committed to another branch for a
completely different reason. Concerns of judicial competence or potential for
embarrassment may have motivated these decisions, but the Supreme Court has
never held that a court needs to determine the reason for a textual commitment. If
these reasons were important, the Court in Baker could have articulated factor one
to reflect this. It did not. Moreover, it has indicated that factor one standing alone
is sufficient to find a political question.93 Therefore, the only common thread that
ties different textual commitments together is the principle of separation of powers.
2. How Factor Two Preserves Separation of Powers
The second factor examines whether there are “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” for resolving the issue.94 This factor makes the most sense
when placed in the context of separation of powers: the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards is a means by which a court might infer that
the issue is beyond its jurisdiction and that it is more appropriately addressed by
another branch.95 This is because federal courts have an obligation to decide cases
properly before them.96 They are not supposed to decline to hear cases merely
because the questions are exceedingly difficult or complicated.97 If the lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards were only meant to gauge a court’s
ability to resolve an issue, it could be in direct tension with the court’s duty to decide
a case.
It is true that the second factor could be understood as simply asking whether
a court has the means to decide an issue. After all, the factor does not ask whether
another branch would have its own discoverable or manageable standards to decide
the issue; it only asks whether such standards exist with respect to the judicial
branch. However, the political question doctrine has not been described as simply
an issue that a court is incompetent to decide: its description includes the notion
that the question is more properly presented to the political branches of
areas. But this does not change the fact that the first Baker factor asks courts to search for such a
commitment in the Constitution’s text.
93. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
94. Id.
95. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (“[T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate
political department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”).
96. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
97. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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government.98 In light of that description, it makes more sense to understand the
lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards as implying that the political
branches are better suited to deciding the issue.
3. How Factor Three Preserves Separation of Powers
The third factor asks whether, in order to answer the question at issue, an
initial policy determination needs to be made that is clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.99 This factor directly asks whether there is a preliminary policy decision
that has to be made by another branch of government in order to decide the case.
Examples of where such a policy decision may be necessary are where Congress has
not yet passed legislation on an issue, where an agency has not yet promulgated any
regulations on a topic,100 or where a treaty has not yet been ratified between
countries. A court may not be comfortable adjudicating a case in such a situation
because it may be concerned with legislating from the bench. But once there is a
relevant statute, regulation, or treaty on point, then the court may be able to exercise
its judicial powers to decide the issue.
For example, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to decide issues arising in
the context of foreign relations, but it has been more willing and more assertive in
doing so if interpretation of a statute or a treaty is involved.101 In Medellin v. Texas,
the Supreme Court held that an International Court of Justice decision was not
binding on domestic courts based on the language of the U.N. Charter, Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and the Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention.102 The Court’s
decision stands out because it was directly contrary to the position of the
Executive,103 a branch that typically is granted great discretion in foreign affairs.104
The Court’s willingness to enter this arena when a statute or treaty is involved
makes sense. It may not be the province of the Court to decide whether an
American can name “Israel” as his place of birth on his passport105 or whether to
sanction a foreign country for violating international whaling quotas,106 but once
98. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
99. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
100. Such a situation may also be dismissed on the basis of ripeness. However, where Congress
or an agency has not spoken on an issue, there may be an open policy question that a federal court may
not have discretion to answer. In fact, the lack of regulation itself may be a policy decision by an agency.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–34 (2007) (holding that EPA may refuse to promulgate
regulations as long as it provides a “reasoned explanation”).
101. Compare Terlinden, 184 U.S. 270 and Doe, 57 U.S. 635 with Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421; Japan
Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. 221; and Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
102. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506–611.
103. Id. at 503.
104. See, e.g., id. at 523–24 (conceding that the President’s constitutional role ‘uniquely qualifies’
him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision);
American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (noting the President’s “vast share of
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations” and his “independent authority to act”).
105. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424.
106. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 223.

Park FINAL [4.6.17] (Do Not Delete)

2016]

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

4/14/2017 5:44 PM

269

there is a statute or treaty on those issues, the Court is certainly empowered to
decide whether or not the statute or treaty is constitutional or to interpret its
language.107 The initial policy determination having been made, the Court is now
able to bring its tools of interpretation to bear on the subject.
4. How Factor Four Preserves Separation of Powers
The fourth factor questions whether judicial action would be impossible
without expressing “a lack of the respect due” a coordinate branch of
government.108 There would be a lack of respect to another branch of government
only if the judiciary were operating beyond its bounds and encroaching upon the
powers of another branch. If a court were simply acting beyond its Article III
limitations—for example, if a federal court were to decide a case involving only state
issues and no diversity—it would not necessarily be disrespecting the legislative or
executive branches. Neither Congress nor the Executive has the power to interpret
the law; that is, to “say what the law is.”109 Therefore, a federal court deciding such
a case would not be infringing on any powers assigned to those branches. The
disrespected body in this example would be the States, and more specifically, the
State judiciaries. And the political question doctrine has been understood to refer
to those issues that the political branches of government must decide, not the
judiciary.110 In this example, the issue is not necessarily beyond the province of
courts to decide; rather, the wrong courts are deciding them. Therefore, factor four
makes the most sense when “lack of the respect due” refers specifically to the
encroachment of the judiciary on the powers of the legislative or executive
branches.
5. How Factor Five Preserves Separation of Powers
The fifth factor asks whether there is an unusual need for “unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made” by another branch of government.111
The suggestion is that in such a situation the judiciary should not interfere with the
exercise of another branch’s powers. This factor only makes sense when understood
as applying to the judicial branch vis-à-vis the other two branches. As far as the
judicial branch itself is concerned, there is already an established hierarchy between
the courts: the district courts adhere to the holdings of their respective circuit courts
of appeals, and all courts adhere to the holdings of the Supreme Court on federal
and constitutional law. More importantly, the political branches are the ones
empowered to make “political” decisions.112 Since the judicial branch is prohibited
107. See, e.g., id.; Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1424.
108. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
109. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
110. See id. at 170.
111. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
112. See id.
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from making such decisions,113 at least theoretically there should be no situation
calling a court to unquestioningly adhere to a political decision made by another
court.
Admittedly, court opinions are often motivated by political considerations and
can be perceived as political decisions.114 However, even these opinions are couched
in legal reasoning, and courts are limited by the constraints imposed by textual
language and precedent.115 Even Bush v. Gore—considered a political decision by
many people—was written as a legal opinion on an Equal Protection claim.116 Given
the fact that even the most “political” court opinions are written with at least a
veneer of legal analysis, there is a practical difficulty in determining which opinions
are “political decisions” and which are “legal decisions.”
Instead, the factor calling for “unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made” operates less problematically when it is considered specifically with
regard to the legislative and executive branches. The business of the courts often
involves interpreting and declaring the constitutionality of congressional or
executive action. On some level, all congressional or executive actions are “political”
decisions, and in exercising their powers, courts are often actively contesting these
decisions and causing tension with the idea of separation of powers. In light of the
ever-present danger of overreach and encroachment on the powers of the other
branches, this factor ensures that courts take pause before plunging forward with a
judicial decision.
6. How Factor Six Preserves Separation of Powers
The final factor asks whether judicial action would create a “potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one

113. See id.
114. E.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary
Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407 (2001); Ledyard King, Regular People, Weighty Decision Put
High Court in New Light, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 14, 2000 (quoting Michael Gerhardt as stating
that “the court has transformed itself into a political institution” after Bush v. Gore); Jeffrey Rosen,
Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18 (arguing that the Court after Bush v. Gore has “made it
impossible for citizens of the United States to sustain any kind of faith in the rule of law”); David G.
Savage & Henry Weinstein, Supreme Court Ruling: Right or Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at A24
(quoting Akhil Reed Amar as stating that “[m]any of us thought that courts do not act in an openly
political fashion. So [Bush v. Gore] comes as a startling event that has shaken constitutional faith.”).
115. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 372–73 (“The words of the constitution are sufficiently express . . .
that these Courts may be thus controlled . . . .”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We give
the words of a statute their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an indication Congress
intended them to bear some different import.”) (quoting Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc.,
519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
443 (2000) (“While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, particularly when we are interpreting
the Constitution, even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have
always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (“With respect to the equal protection question, we find a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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question.”117 As with the previous factors, this factor makes the most sense if it is
concerned with the interaction of judicial decisions with the actions of the other
two branches. “Potentiality of embarrassment” arises when there are conflicting
pronouncements from two or all branches of government on an issue where it is
not clear which branch has the ultimate authority. “Multifarious” pronouncements
from various departments within the judicial branch do not present the same
problem because when different courts or departments of the judicial branch
pronounce conflicting opinions, the hierarchy of the judicial system makes clear
whose pronouncements are controlling. Such clarity does not necessarily exist when
two or three separate branches of government speak simultaneously on the same
issue. In such a situation there is a real risk that a court may be operating outside of
its constitutional bounds. As with factor five, this factor ensures that courts
carefully consider the cases before them when making a judicial decision.
Although a “potentiality of embarrassment” may exist when a court properly
exercises its Article III powers, this cannot be what the Supreme Court had in mind
with this factor. Given that courts are generally obligated to exercise jurisdiction
where they have it,118 the mere potentiality of embarrassment cannot be enough to
stay a court’s hand. In its history, the Court has decided cases that have brought it
into conflict with the other branches of government in ways that could be
considered as having created a “potentiality for embarrassment.”119 Nevertheless,
the opinions that came out of those cases have been considered perfectly valid
judicial decisions and no political question was found. Therefore, the “potentiality
for embarrassment” cannot simply be from a judicial opinion that conflicts with a
pronouncement of the legislative or executive branch. There must also be the added
requirement that the ultimate authority on the matter is unclear—that a court is not
only in conflict with another branch, but that it may have no business opining on
the issue at all.
IV. WHY THE DOCTRINE IS BOTH JURISDICTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL
An analysis of the six Baker factors indicates that the best answer to the
question of whether the political question doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential is
that the first factor is jurisdictional and the other five factors are prudential. Such
an answer is not unusual. Other justiciability doctrines also contain mixed
jurisdictional and prudential elements. For example, standing has jurisdictional
117. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
118. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404.
119. E.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the
National Industrial Recovery Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (voiding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (voiding legislation regulating
the coal industry); Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (voiding a New York minimum wage
law for women and children). These decisions ultimately led to the proposal of the Judicial Procedures
Reform Bill of 1937, which was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s effort to add additional Justices
to the Supreme Court. See Michael E. Parrish, THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND
LEGACY 24 (2002).
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elements (injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability) as well as prudential
elements (zone-of-interest and third-party standing).120 Ripeness is “drawn both
from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for
refusing to exercise jurisdiction.”121 Therefore, making a similar division within the
political question doctrine would not be at all novel or contrary to how the Court
has treated other justiciability doctrines.
A. The Jurisdictional Component
The first Baker factor is jurisdictional. It asks whether there is “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department.”122 Of all the Baker factors, this is the only one that explicitly grounds
itself in the Constitution.123 As the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, no
court, including the Supreme Court, is free to flout its provisions.124 If the first
factor were prudential, then a court could exercise discretion in invoking it in cases
where the first factor is at issue. This would make no sense. It would essentially
mean that the judicial branch could consider an issue textually committed to the
executive or legislative branch by the Constitution—a violation of separation of
powers.
Of course, the Constitution’s text is not always explicit on which matters are
committed to which branches.125 Therefore, some degree of textual interpretation
is required for courts to decide whether the first factor has been implicated.126
However, this does not mean that courts are free to arbitrarily decide which issues
are assigned to which branches.127 They are still confined to the text of the
Constitution in conducting their analyses.
While this may be an unsatisfying answer, the Article III justiciability doctrines
exhibit similar problems. The elements of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact,
traceability, and redressability—cannot be found in the text of Article III or
anywhere else in the Constitution. Rather, these elements have been developed by
the Supreme Court over a series of opinions; they give effect to the requirement

120. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
121. National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dept. of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)).
122. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
123. Id.
124. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (“Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of
the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.”).
125. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring) (“Although Baker directs the Court to search
for a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment’ of such responsibility, there are few, if any,
explicit and unequivocal instances in the Constitution of this sort of textual commitment.”).
126. Id. (“The courts therefore are usually left to infer the presence of a political question from
the text and structure of the Constitution.”).
127. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (“‘The judicial Power’ created by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution
is not whatever judges choose to do . . . .”).
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that Article III courts adjudicate actual “Cases” or “Controversies” and prevent
them from issuing advisory opinions.128 That many more cases turn on the issue of
standing has led to a much more detailed and nuanced development of the standing
doctrine, but there is no reason why the political question doctrine would not be
amenable to similar development through case law. Moreover, the courts have used
traditional tools of textual and historical interpretation to determine whether certain
issues have been textually committed to a particular branch of government.129
There may be occasions where the traditional tools do not work. The Court
has sometimes stated that the issue of whether a matter is textually committed to
another branch of government is intertwined with the issue of whether judicially
manageable standards exist for its resolution.130 However, this should not be taken
to mean that factors one and two are the same or that factor two is also
jurisdictional. It may be the case that an issue is textually committed to another
branch of government, even though judicially manageable standards exist.131
Nonetheless, a federal court would not have jurisdiction over the matter.
Conversely, a case may be textually committed to the judiciary (or the Constitution
may be silent or neutral on the issue), but judicially manageable standards may prove
elusive.132 In that case, a court may have jurisdiction, but for prudential reasons the
wiser course of action may be to abstain from judgment.133
In a situation where the traditional tools of interpretation fail to serve a federal
court in its interpretation of the Constitution’s text, and there is no other tool to
serve in their stead, it would be better to say that the Constitution is either silent or
neutral on the issue. It is unlikely that the Framers would have made the
commitment of a particular issue so difficult to discern that a court is unable to
determine the Constitution’s command one way or the other.134
B. The Prudential Components
The other five Baker factors are prudential. There is an argument that these
other factors also serve to preserve the explicit separation of powers articulated in
the Constitution. However, this would make the five factors duplicative of the first
factor, which explicitly asks whether an issue has been committed by the
128. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102–04; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–62; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 154–456 (1990); Allen, 468 U.S. at 750–052; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–501.
129. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–231, 233–36 (analyzing the use and definition of the word
“sole” and the history behind the drafting of impeachment provisions in the Constitution); Powell, 395
U.S. at 521–47 (going into extensive detail of the history behind qualifications for House membership).
130. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.
131. Id. at 245–51 (White, J., concurring) (explaining why the definition of the word “try” is
“hardly so elusive as the majority would have it”).
132. See, e.g., Vieth, 451 U.S. at 312 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905) (“It must also be remembered
that the framers of the Constitution were . . . practical men . . . putting into form the government they
were creating, and prescribing, in language clear and intelligible, the powers that government was to
take.”).
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Constitution to the legislative or executive branches of government. Given the
careful consideration that goes into the drafting of Supreme Court opinions and the
development of tests that will be used by courts throughout the country, it makes
more sense for the five factors to address separation of powers considerations
beyond those explicitly stated within the Constitution.135
These considerations include questions of judicial competence to address an
issue before the court and concerns regarding the prudent exercise of judicial
review.136 The second and third factors ask whether the case before the court calls
for decision-making beyond the court’s competence.137 If a court is incompetent to
decide an issue, then perhaps the issue is better committed to one of the other
branches. The fourth, fifth, and sixth factors ask whether judicial action would
result in disrespect of or embarrassment to the other branches of government or to
the government as a whole.138 Such a result may imply that the court is encroaching
on an area that is committed to another branch.
1.

Prudential Factors Two and Three: Decision-Making Beyond a Court’s Competence

The second and third Baker factors are:139
2. Whether there is a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the issue.
3. Whether it is impossible to decide the issue without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.
Justice Sotomayor expressed in a concurring opinion that these factors address
the competence of courts to decide an issue.140 The judicial power created by Article
III of the Constitution is not “whatever judges choose to do but rather the power
to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts.”141 Justice
Sotomayor took this to mean “the application of some manageable and cognizable
standard within the competence of the Judiciary to ascertain and employ to the facts
of a concrete case.”142 If a court has no standard by which to adjudicate a dispute,
or cannot resolve a dispute in the absence of a policy determination charged to a
political branch, the suit is beyond Article III review.143 This is not to say that courts
are incapable of interpreting or applying somewhat ambiguous standards using
135. It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court would intend to create redundant factors when
even Supreme Court dicta can carry great weight in lower courts’ analyses. See United States v. Oakar,
111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 6 F.3d 856,
861 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993)) (“Carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically
dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.”).
136. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
140. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
141. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
142. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
143. Id.
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traditional tools of statutory or constitutional interpretation.144 But where such tools
are completely useless in helping a court decide an issue and no other tool can be
ascertained, the best decision from the court may be to abstain from judgment.145
In contrast with factor one, prudential considerations motivate factors two
and three. On its face, the lack of judicially manageable standards does not address
whether a court has proper jurisdiction over an issue, but whether a court has the
competence to decide an issue. It is a consideration that is completely separate from
whether an issue is properly before the court. The impossibility of making a decision
without making a preliminary policy choice also addresses whether the court is
capable of making a decision, not whether an issue is properly within the court’s
jurisdiction. One might imagine that once the proper branch of government makes
a policy decision, the court may then proceed to decide the dispute if it still exists.
This latter consideration has much in common with the doctrine of prudential
ripeness, where a court determines that the timing of a dispute counsels against
hearing the case.146
While these two factors seek to preserve separation of powers, they cannot
originate from the Constitution unless they are to be redundant in light of the first
factor. If there is a constitutional prohibition against judicial review, it would be
identified by a court applying the first factor. Instead, these two factors help identify
a political question when the Constitution is silent or neutral on the issue.
The cases where the second and third factors alone identify a political question
should be few. Courts have a duty to resolve a controversy within their traditional
competence and proper jurisdiction and cannot refuse simply because the question
is difficult.147 Indeed, courts have consistently managed to craft tests or other
modes of analysis to decide difficult and novel questions brought before it.148 That
these tests may have flaws or ambiguities in their application are not sufficient
reasons to declare that no judicially discoverable or manageable standard exists.
Many of the tests that are currently used by federal courts suffer from imperfections
in their construction or their application.149 This does not rob such tests of
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents the notion of ‘not yet.’”).
147. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404.
148. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(establishing level of deference to agency constructions of statutes); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of
Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (establishing a balancing test for determining “fundamental fairness”
under the Due Process Clause); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (recognizing that
intermediate scrutiny applies to Equal Protection Clause claims alleging discrimination on the basis of
sex or illegitimacy).
149. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 209 (1989) (criticizing the Batson framework for
eliminating race-based peremptory strikes); Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the
Constitution: Finding a Standard That Works, 82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1174 (2007) (criticizing the Anderson/
Burdick test for deciding voting disenfranchisement claims); Laura L. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling
Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933 (1993) (criticizing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
and its effect on the doctrine of standing).
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legitimacy. Declaring that there are no judicially discoverable or manageable
standards to judge the issue or that reaching a decision is impossible without making
a preliminary policy choice should occur only when there are essentially no judicial
standards by which a court can proceed or where a preliminary policy is demanded
by the circumstances.
2.

Prudential Factors Four, Five, and Six: Disrespect and Embarrassment Counseling
Against Judicial Review

The final three Baker factors are:150
4. Whether it is impossible for a court to undertake
independent resolution of the issue without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government.
5. Whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made.
6. Whether there is a potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Each of these factors amounts to prudential considerations. Factor four
implies that when judicial action does not express the proper amount of respect due
the other two branches of government there may be an overstepping of judicial
authority. Factor five is similarly concerned with overstepping judicial boundaries
and conflicting with a political decision made by another branch of government.
Factor six is concerned about courts potentially embarrassing a branch of
government or the government as a whole by addressing a question that might need
to be answered by another branch of government.
Each of these factors should be construed as an additional means of
safeguarding the principle of separation of powers, but they do not make much
sense as constitutional limitations. With respect to factor four, it is not clear when
a court expresses a “lack of respect” towards another branch of government.
Federal courts do not express a “lack of respect” for the other branches of
government when they interpret the law or consider the constitutionality of
government action.151 Their constitutionally mandated responsibility is to do exactly
that.152 For a court to find such a “lack of respect,” it must necessarily look beyond
the simple exercise of its powers. Where there is a lack of respect, there may be an
overstepping of judicial authority.
Regarding factor five, courts are not supposed to make or otherwise involve
themselves in political decisions.153 To the extent that courts are making political
150. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
151. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“It is emphatically the
province and of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
152. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
153. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (“Questions, in their nature political . . . can never be
made in this court.”).
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decisions or going beyond their constitutionally enumerated powers, factor one
already addresses those situations. Therefore, factor five refers to those political
decisions made by the other two branches and asks courts to consider whether this
is an occasion where there is an unusual need to adhere to those decisions. Where
courts rule against those decisions, they may be overstepping their bounds.
Finally, factor six requires courts to pause when confronted with an issue
where their jurisdiction is unclear. Typically, ruling on the constitutionality of a
statute or otherwise interpreting the law, rather than adding to a cacophony of
pronouncements from the other branches of government, acts to resolve any
dispute and finally settle the matter in question.154 Therefore, the mere exercise of
Article III powers cannot qualify as one of the “multifarious” pronouncements that
factor six refers to. Instead, factor six asks courts to consider whether a judicial
opinion would not ultimately resolve a dispute and thereby result in embarrassment
from conflicting pronouncements between branches. If it might, again the courts
may be overstepping their bounds.
Taken together, the last three factors are considerations a court should take
into account to ensure that it exercises its powers in a manner that is sensitive to
the principle of separation of powers between the three branches of government.
There should be very few cases where such considerations rise to a level where
courts should abstain from deciding an issue. The mere fact that a court is called
upon to resolve the constitutionality of an act of another branch of government is
not enough.155 And a court cannot refuse to adjudicate a dispute merely because a
decision has “significant” political overtones or affects the country’s foreign
relations in general.156 Courts have a duty to resolve a controversy within their
traditional competence and proper jurisdiction157 and cannot refuse simply because
“the question is difficult, the consequences weighty, or [the decision] might conflict
with the policy preferences of the political branches.”158
Instances where the courts have declined to exercise their powers for the
reasons expressed in the last three factors are very few. Historically, they have been
limited to cases questioning the good faith with which another branch attests to the

154. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
155. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390–091 (1990) (“If it were, every judicial
resolution of a constitutional challenge to a congressional enactment would be impermissible.”).
156. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230.
157. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404 (“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature
may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by
because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can
do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.”).
158. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404.
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authenticity of its internal acts.159 Although the Court has suggested that situations
where there is an unusual need for finality to the action of a particular branch,160 or
where there is an acute risk of “embarrassment of our government abroad or grave
disturbance at home,” might be sufficient to render a question political,161 there is
no case where the Court has actually held so on those grounds alone.
Moreover, the last three Baker factors find common ground with the doctrine
of prudential ripeness under which considerations of justiciability or comity lead
courts to abstain from deciding questions whose initial resolution is better
postponed to a later time.162 As Justice Sotomayor expressed with respect to the
political question doctrine, “it may be appropriate for courts to stay their hand in
cases implicating delicate questions concerning the distribution of political authority
between coordinate branches until a dispute is ripe, intractable, and incapable of
resolution by the political process.”163
As its name suggests, prudential ripeness is considered a prudential, not
jurisdictional, doctrine.164 And as with the political question doctrine, the court is
not necessarily issuing an advisory opinion when ruling on an issue that might be
unripe for review. Rather, considerations of whether a plaintiff has exhausted all
administrative remedies165 or whether the factual record is sufficiently developed
determine whether a court will declare an issue ripe.166 The determination is that the
timing of review is not proper.167 A similar concern animates the last three Baker
factors.
V. HOW TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE UNDER THIS FRAMEWORK
Concluding that the first factor of the political question doctrine is
jurisdictional and the other five factors are prudential means that issues that have
been held political based solely on the prudential Baker factors are not forever
barred from adjudication. The factual context surrounding a particular case that
justifies abstention may not exist in another case addressing the same issue. For
159. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672–73 (1892); see also Sherman v. Story,
30 Cal. 253, 276 (1866); Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512, 526–627 (1886).
160. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–455 (1939).
161. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
162. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Nat’l Park
Hosp. Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 808; Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998); Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 892 (1990).
163. Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1433 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
164. Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013) (noting that the Court has
recognized that “prudential ripeness” is not jurisdictional).
165. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (stating that one of the “basic
rationale[s]” of the ripeness doctrine is “to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties”), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
166. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891 (stating that a regulation is not ordinarily “ripe” for judicial review
under the APA until “the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions,
and its factual components fleshed out”).
167. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 584–485 (“[R]ipeness represents the notion of ‘not yet.’”).
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example, the final three Baker factors examine the context in which a judicial
decision is being made and not the issue before the court. Asking whether a court
is exhibiting a lack of respect due a coordinate branch, is faced with an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or is creating a
potentiality for embarrassment questions the wisdom of the court exercising its
power in a specific context, rather than the power or ability of the court to make a
decision on the issue. Therefore, the same issue raised in a completely different
context does not necessarily implicate the last three factors. The unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to the political decision might no longer exist or the
potentiality for embarrassment might no longer be present.
Even a political question based on the second and third Baker factors should
not result in an issue being forever barred from adjudication. Judicially manageable
standards may not exist presently, but could be discovered or developed in the
future.168 And an issue that requires an initial policy determination that is clearly for
nonjudicial discretion may in fact return before the court after that policy
determination is made. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth suggests that some
issues that are considered political now might lose that label later.169
The only political questions that are forever withheld from judicial
consideration are those that have been textually committed in the Constitution to
another branch of government. Barring a constitutional amendment, federal courts
have no discretion to decide issues that are constitutionally committed to the
executive or legislative branches.170
Courts reviewing cases involving questions that have been held political would
then have to determine whether the question is political on jurisdictional or
prudential grounds. Traditional tools of judicial analysis should be sufficient to
make this determination. If an earlier case held that an issue was political based on
the first factor, or some combination of the first factor and the other five factors,
then it remains political. For example, a question regarding the proper process of
impeachment in the Senate would likely remain political if raised again because the
Court in Nixon held that the issue was textually committed to the Senate.171 On the
other hand, if it had been held political based on some combination of the other
five factors, then a court should evaluate whether those factors are still implicated
in the case before it. For example, political gerrymandering cases may not necessarily
be political if raised in a future case because judicially manageable standards of
review may be discovered or developed that overcome the concerns expressed by
the Court in Vieth.172 A court would have to evaluate on a case-by-case basis

168. See Vieth, 451 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That no such standard has emerged
in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.”).
169. See id.
170. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (“[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void; and . . .
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”).
171. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–33.
172. See Vieth, 451 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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whether any earlier holding was reached on jurisdictional or prudential grounds, and
then rule accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The political question doctrine seeks to preserve an important foundational
principle of our system of government: the separation of powers. To more clearly
define the scope of the doctrine, the Supreme Court laid out six factors for
consideration when deciding any political question issue. However, the Court failed
to specify whether this doctrine is jurisdictional or prudential. Although cases have
been decided without explicitly answering that question, the consequences of an
answer are significant and both courts and litigators deserve clarity on the issue. An
analysis of the six Baker factors shows that only the first factor poses a jurisdictional
question, and the remaining five consist of only prudential considerations. Courts
should conduct their analyses in accordance with these distinctions, and any prior
decisions finding political questions should be evaluated in light of which factors
motivated the courts’ conclusions in those cases. In this way, the political question
doctrine will be better applied when it is invoked by litigants and courts, and the six
Baker factors will be applied with proper consideration of how each one relates to
the goal of preserving the separation of powers in our federal government.

